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1 Introduction 
Aster models (Geyer, Wagenius and Shaw, 2007; Shaw, Geyer, Wagenius, 
Hangelbroek and Etterson, 2008) are statistical models designed especially 
for life history analysis of plants and animals. 
Aster models are parametric statistical models. In some senses they are 
quite ordinary statistical models. The theory of aster models is just the the-
ory of likelihood inference (Fisher, 1922; Severini, 2001) and the theory of 
exponential families of distributions (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978; Brown, 1986; 
Geyer, 1990). Given an aster model and data, we use the method of max-
imum likelihood for parameter estimation; we use likelihood ratio tests for 
model comparison; and we use confidence intervals based on the asymptotic 
distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). Details are given 
in Geyer et al. (2007); see also Section 2.11 below. 
The theory mentioned in the preceding paragraph is known to all statisti-
cians, covered, albeit not completely rigorously, in first-year graduate courses 
in theoretical statistics and covered again, this time completely rigorously, 
in second-year graduate courses in theoretical statistics. Many scientists in 
a wide variety of disciplines take a first-year graduate course in theoretical 
statistics, so this theory is very widely known. 
Aster models are regression models. In some senses they are quite like 
linear models (LM), which include multiple linear regression and analy-
sis of variance ( explained in many textbooks, for example, Weisberg, 2005 
and Oehlert, 2000), and generalized linear models (GLM) (McCullagh and 
Nelder, 1989). In regression models the objective is to model the conditional 
distribution of the response vector y given predictor data x (the structure of 
which does not matter). Aster models have the same objective. In LM and 
GLM, conditional on x the components of y are assumed to be stochastically 
independent and to have marginal distributions from the same family e. g., 
all normal, all Bernoulli, or all Poisson. In aster models, in contrast, condi-
tional on x the components of y are allowed to be stochastically dependent 
and are allowed to have conditional distributions from different families e.g., 
some normal, some Bernoulli, and some Poisson. 
LM and GLM are known to all statisticians, covered, albeit not at all 
rigorously, in undergraduate statistics courses and covered again, this time 
much more rigorously, in first-year graduate courses in applied statistics 
(proofs are left for theoretical statistics courses). Many scientists in a wide 
variety of disciplines take these courses, so these models are very widely 
known. Some courses teach ways of thinking about LM that do not gener-
alize to GLM and ways of thinking about GLM that do not generalize to 
aster models. 1 Thus people who have had courses covering LM and GLM 
may have to unlearn certain things they learned about LM and GLM and 
learn more general concepts to understand aster models. 
Aster models are graphical models (Lauritzen, 1996), but a very special 
case thereof. The only idea aster models take from graphical model theory is 
the fundamental idea of representing conditional distribution relationships 
between random variables by graphs. None of the mathematical theory of 
graphical models is used in aster model theory. Although there are a number 
of recent textbooks covering graphical models, many statistics departments 
do not teach courses using them. Thus the theory of graphical models is 
not widely known {few statisticians are expert in it), so it is fortunate aster 
models need so little of the theory of graphical models. 
The "linear" in LM comes from the fact that means are modeled linearly2 
µ = M/3, (1) 
whereµ= E(y) is the mean of the response vector,3 where Mis a known 
matrix, called the model matrix, which may be an arbitrary function of 
predictor data x, where {3 is an unknown parameter to be estimated, and 
where M (3 is multiplication of a matrix M and a vector (3 yielding a vec-
tor µ. Usually, the dimension of {3 is much less than the dimension of µ 
(which is the dimension of y). This "dimension reduction" in the jargon al-
lows the explanation of something complicated involving many parameters 
(the components ofµ) by something simple involving fewer parameters (the 
components of (3), a "parsimonious model" in the jargon. It also contributes 
to efficient estimation (Section 2.11 below); the fewer the parameters, the 
better the estimation, in general. 
1They may imply that the word "regression" only applies to a subset of LM (multiple 
regression but not analysis of variance) not to GLM or aster models. This, of course, 
cannot be because the terms "logistic regression" and "Poisson regression" for certain 
GLM are well established, as is the term "nonparametric regression" for models that are 
neither LM nor GLM. Most courses about LM teach "response is mean+ error" 
y=µ+e 
but this does not generalize even to GLM. See also Sections 2.8 and 2.10. 
2The term "linear" is used here in the technical mathematical sense, as in "linear 
equations" and "linear algebra" and has no connection with the vague metaphorical sense 
popular in postmodern ism, as in "linear thinking." 
3Strictly speaking, we should writeµ = E(y I x), a conditional expectation, instead 
ofµ= E(y), an unconditional expectation, because we are conditioning on the predictor 
data x, but we follow common practice of not explicitly indicating this in the notation. 
The fact that µ depends on x is implicit in (I) because M is allowed to be an arbitrary 
function of x. 
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The "linear" in GLM comes from the fact that parameters other than 
means are modeled linearly 
11= M{3, (2) 
where 11 is a new parameter vector, called the linear predictor, and M and 
f3 are as in LM. The linear predictor is a componentwise monotone function 
of means 
'Tli = g(µi), 
where g is a monotone (strictly increasing) function called the link junction 
and where 'Tli and µi denote components of 11 and µ. The reason for this 
monotone change-of-parameter is that modeling means linearly makes no 
sense when possible mean values are constrained. When y has Bernoulli 
(zero-or-one-valued) components, their means satisfy 
0 ~ µi ~ 1 
but linear modeling (1) does not respect these constraints. The link function 
is often chosen so that the linear predictor is unconstrained. For example, 
in Bernoulli GLM the link function 
11i = logit(µ;) = log ( 1 ~\J (3) 
is the default ( other link functions are allowed, but this is by far the most 
widely used), and one easily verifies that as µi goes from zero to one, T/i 
goes from minus infinity to plus infinity. GLM have a weak connection to 
exponential family theory in that the default link function is the one that 
makes the linear predictor the exponential family canonical parameter, for 
example, the logit link (3) for Bernoulli GLM and the log link 
'Tli = log(µi) 
for Poisson GLM (again one easily verifies that as µi goes from zero to plus 
infinity, the allowed values for Poisson means, f/i goes from minus infinity to 
plus infinity).4 
The "linear" in aster models comes from the fact that, just as in GLM, 
parameters other than means are modeled linearly (2).5 In aster models, 
4 Not all exponential family canonical parameters are unrestricted, see footnote 21. 
5 Actually Geyer et al. (2007) describe a more general type of modeling in which (2) is 
generalized to 
77=a+M/31 (4) 
where a is a known vector, called the offset vector, and this formula is also used (rarely) 
with GLM. The offset term a is not needed for most GLM and aster models and we ignore 
it here. When (4) is used instead of {2) the proper term is "affine" rather than "linear" 
for this change-of-parameter. 
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unlike GLM, no choice of link function is allowed; the linear predictor vector 
r, is always the exponential family canonical parameter vector. Since com-
ponents of the response are allowed to be dependent in aster models, there is 
no simple relationship between marginal distributions of components of the 
response and their joint distribution (unlike LM and GLM where stochastic 
independence implies the joint is the product of the marginals). Thus the 
componentwise monotone relationship of linear predictor and means used in 
GLM makes less sense for aster models.6 Instead, exponential family theory 
implies that the mean vector µ is a multivariate strictly monotone function 
of r, (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978, p. 121). The notion of a multivariate mono-
tone function can be characterized in several different ways (Rockafellar and 
Wets, 2004, Chapter 12); here is one. Suppose 'f/1 and 'f/2 are two different 
allowed values of the linear predictor parameter vector and µ1 and µ2 are 
the corresponding values of the mean vector. Then 
where ( · , · ) denotes the bilinear form defined by 
p 
(µ,'f/) = Lµi'f/i, 
i=l 
(5) 
p being the dimension ofµ and T/· It may be thought that this property 
is too abstract to be of much use; it is certainly not taught in any of the 
theoretical or applied statistics courses mentioned above. But it is a very 
strong property that enables important arguments about aster modeling 
(Shaw and Geyer, submitted, appendix on monotonicity; see also Section 2.9 
below). 
2 Key Ideas behind Aster Models 
2.1 Graphical Models 
Prototypical data for an aster model can be pictured as shown in (6), 
which represents the data for one individual, which comprises eight mea-
6 Emily Grosholz (personal communication) points out that the "thus" here is not justi-
fied. There is no logical reason (apparent to the author) why there could not, in principle, 
be an aster model competitor with componentwise monotone relationship between uncon-
ditional mean values and some other parameters. Such a competitor could not have all 
properties of aster models; see Section 3 below. 
4 
surements (components of the response vector y), denoted Y1, ... , YB· 
1 ~ Ber Ber Ber 
__, Y1 ----+ Y2 ----+ Ya ----+ Y4 
(6) 
Ys Y6 Y1 YB 
These data are measurements relating to four time periods. The variables 
Y1, ... , y4 are Bernoulli and indicate survival; Yi = 1 indicates that the 
individual was alive at the beginning of the i-th time period, Yi= 0 indicates 
that the individual was dead at the beginning of this time period. The 
variables Ys, ... , YB are nonnegative-integer-valued and count offspring; Yi is 
the number of offspring the individual had in time period i - 4. 
The arrows represent stochastic dependence ( the idea taken from the 
theory of graphical models). The variable at the head of an arrow depends 
on the variable or constant at the tail of the arrow. For example, Yl = 0 
implies Y2 = 0 and Ys = 0 (if the individual is dead at the beginning of the 
first time period, then it remains dead at the beginning of the second time 
period and cannot have offspring). 
We say the variable at the head of an arrow is the successor of the 
variable or constant at the tail of the arrow ( the leftmost arrow has the 
constant 1 at its tail). Conversely, we say the variable or constant at the 
tail of an arrow is the predecessor of the variable at the head of the arrow. 
For example, y3 is the successor of Y2 and the predecessor of y4 and y7. 
The graph represents stochastic dependence much more precisely than we 
have explained so far. It represents a factorization of the joint distribution 
of these random variables as a product of conditional distributions 
B 
f (Y1, ···,YB) = IT f (Yi I Yp(j)), 
j=l 
(7) 
where p is the predecessor function: Yp(j) denotes the variable or constant 
that is the predecessor of YJ (when Yp(j) is a constant the conditional distri-
bution of Yi given Yp(j) is, in effect, unconditional). 
Aster models are a very special case of graphical models in which each 
node of the graph (representing a random variable or a constant) has at 
most one predecessor and the graph is acyclic, meaning there is no path of 
arrows joined head to tail that goes around in a loop. Such a graph is called 
a / orest in graph theory. 
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constants is called a maximal connected component of the graph.8 
Returning to biology, different maximal connected components represent 
data on different individuals. Variables within one maximal connected com-
ponent represent different measurements on a single individual. As shown in 
(9) it is not necessary that all individuals have the same number of variables 
connected in the same graphical structure: in (9) there are three individuals 
(maximal connected components), and each is different from the others. 
However, in all applications of aster models that have been done so far 
all individuals have the same graphical structure and the current version of 
the aster software (Geyer, 2009b) encourages users to think this way. In all 
papers about aster models that have been written so far the graphs shown 
refer to one individual, and it is assumed that all individuals have the same 
graphical structure (in the full graph, never shown, all maximal connected 
components are isomorphic subgraphs, and what is shown is just one of these 
subgraphs). 
Aster model graphs can be much more complicated than those shown 
above. They can be arbitrarily complicated subject to the conditions de-
scribed above that make the graph a forest (acyclic and each node has at 
most one predecessor). Here is an example taken from Shaw and Geyer 
(submitted) 
1 Ber Ber Ber Ber --+ YI --+ Y2 --+ Y3 ----+ Y4 
l Ber l Ber l Ber l Ber 
Ys Y6 Y1 YB 
10-Poi 10-Poi 10-Poi 10-Poi 
yg Y10 Yu Y12 (10) 
lPoi lPoi lPoi lPoi 
Y13 YI4 Y1s Y16 
lBer 1 Ber lBer l Ber 
Y11 Yts Yt9 Y20 
We still have not explained the labels on the arrows in (6) and (10). 
That will have to wait until Section 2.4. 
8 Each maximal connected component of a forest graph is called a tree in graph theory 
(hence the name "forest" for a collection of trees), but we avoid this biological terminology, 
because aster models have biological applications, which may involve real biological trees. 
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2.2 Predecessor as Sample Size 
The dependence in each conditional distribution of Yi given Yp(j) in (8) is 
of a very specific form: the predecessor plays the role of sample size for the 
successor. This means that Yi is the sum of Yp(j) independent and identically 
distributed (11D) random variables. By convention, a sum having zero terms 
is defined to be zero. Hence Yp(j) = 0 implies Yi = 0 with probability one. 
The "predecessor is sample size" property has the following consequence. 
Define9 
µi = E(yj) 
{j = E(yi I Yp(j) = 1) 
(lla) 
(llb) 
In words, µj is the unconditional mean value of Yi and {j is the mean value of 
one of the IID random variables of which Yi is the sum. We call the vector µ 
with components µi the unconditional mean value parameter vector and the 
vector { with components {j the conditional mean value parameter vector. 
Because the expectation of a sum is the sum of the expectations, 
E(yj I Yp(j)) = Yp(j){j, 
and by the iterated expectation theorem 
(12) 
(13) 
Equation (13) is important. It relates conditional and unconditional mean 
values in aster models. It is peculiar to models having the "predecessor 
is sample size" property; it has no analog for general statistical models. 
Iterating it we obtain 
µj = {jµp(j) 
= {j{p(j)µp(p(j)) (14) 
= {j{p(j){p(p(j))µp(p(p(j))) 
and so forth. To find the unconditional mean value for Yi we multiply the 
conditional mean values for all the arrows ( each representing a conditional 
9These definitions differ from those in Geyer et al. (2007) and the documentation for 
the R package aster (Geyer, 2009b). They used r; instead of µ3 and defined {; to be 
(12) rather than {llb). A referee objected to defining {; to be (12) because {12) does 
not define a parameter, being a function of both data and parameters, and in statistics 
greek letters are supposed to denote parameters. Our definitions here belatedly admit the 
referee was right. 
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distribution) going back to the predecessor of predecessor of predecessor etc. 
that is a constant. The expectation of a constant is that constant, so when 
k = p(p(p(j))) or whatever (perhaps more p's) is such that Yk is a constant, 
then µk = Yk, and this allows calculation of all the µj as a function of all 
the ej, 
Conversely, solving (13) for ej gives 
µ· (:. - _:J 
r..:,,3-
µp(j) 
(15) 
except in the case, which never occurs in practice, where the denominator 
on the right-hand side is zero ( division by zero is undefined), and this allows 
calculation of all the ej as a function of all the µj. 
Thus conditional mean values collectively determine unconditional mean 
values and vice versa via (14) and (15). For example, for the graph (6) we 
have 
and 
µ1 =6 
µ2 = 6e1 
µ3 = 66e1 
µ4 = e4e366 
µ5 = es6 
µ6 = e666 
µ7 = 666e1 
µs = ese4e36fa 
e1 = µ1 
6 = µ2/µ1 
6 = µ3/µ2 
e4 = µ4/µ3 
es= µ5/µ1 
{6 = µ6/µ2 
~7 = µ7/µ3 
es= µs/µ4 
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We are not finished with the implications of "predecessor as sample size" 
but the rest will have to wait until Section 2.4, when we will have developed 
more theory. 
2.3 Exponential Families of Distributions 
The likelihood function of a family of distributions is just the probability 
function thought of as a function of the parameters for one fixed data value 
rather than as a function of data for one fixed parameter value. Usually its 
logarithm {log likelihood) is used. For an aster model, the log likelihood is 
the logarithm of (8) 
l(0) = L log fo(Yi I Yp(j)), 
jEJ 
(16) 
where we have added explicit dependence on the parameter vector 0 to the 
conditional probability functions. There is one term in the log likelihood for 
each arrow in the graph. 
Because uses of the log likelihood do not depend on constants, one may 
add or subtract a term that does not depend on the parameters (but may 
depend on the data) without effect on statistical inference. This is usually 
done without comment; additive terms in the log likelihood that do not 
contain parameters are omitted. 
A parametric family of distributions is said to be an exponential family 
if the log likelihood has the form 
l(B) = (y, 0) - c(B), (17) 
where y is a vector statistic (a function of the data that does not depend on 
parameters), 0 is a vector parameter, ( · , · ) is the bilinear form defined by 
(5), and c is a function of the parameter vector called the cumulant function 
of the family. 
The vector statistic y and vector parameter 0 in ( 17) need not be the 
originally given data and parameter; one may need to do either a change-
of-variable or change-of-parameter (or both) to get the log likelihood into 
exponential family form ( 17). To express that y and 0 are the special statistic 
and parameter vectors that appear in ( 17), they are called the canonical 
statistic and canonical parameter. 
Exponential families have a simple relationship with IID ( which, recall 
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from Section 1, means independent and identically distributed).10 Suppose, 
using somewhat confusing notation for this paragraph only, z1, ... , Zn are 
IID random vectors {the confusion is that now subscripts denote different 
random vectors rather than components of one vector) all having the same 
exponential family distribution for which they are the canonical statistic 
vectors and for which 0 is the canonical parameter vector. Stochastic in-
dependence means that the joint probability function is the product of the 
marginals 
n 
f 0(z1, ... , Zn) = IT f o(zi) 
i=l 
from which it follows from the log of a product being the sum of the logs 
that the log likelihood is 
n 
l(B) = L log fe(zi) 
i=l 
and because of the exponential family assumption each term of the log like-
lihood is (17) with y replaced by Zi giving 
n 
l(B) = L[(zi, 0) - c(B)] 
i=l (18) 
= (z1 + · · · + Zn,0) - nc(B) 
Thus we again get an exponential family. The canonical statistic vector for 
IID data is the sum z1 + · · · + Zn of the canonical statistic vectors Zi for the 
IID constituents and the canonical parameter vector 0 is the same for both. 
Moreover, the cumulant function for the IID family is nc(B), just n times 
the cumulant function for the IID constituents. This relationship is peculiar 
to exponential families; it has no analog for general statistical models. 
2.4 Exponential Families and Aster Models 
In an aster model, the conditional distribution associated with each ar-
row in the graph and each term in (16) is required to be a one-parameter 
101n aster models, components of the response vector are neither independent nor iden-
tically distributed (because of the graphical structure and because they have different 
parameters), and in LM and GLM they are not identically distributed (because they have 
different parameters). Nevertheless, the property of exponential family models discussed 
in the remainder of this section will be useful in constructing aster models (Section 2.4 
below). 
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exponential family: Yj has the distribution of a sum of IID random variables 
in some exponential family, the number of terms in the sum being Yp(j) ( this 
is the "predecessor is sample size" property again). From the relationship 
between IID and exponential families in the previous section, this means the 
term of the log likelihood associated with the j-th arrow is 
(19) 
because we have a one-parameter family so the bilinear form becomes just 
Yi0i and what was n in (18) is Yp(i) here because of "predecessor is sam-
ple size." Also we have subscripts on the parameter and cumulant func-
tion because each arrow in the graph may be associated with a different 
one-parameter exponential family, each having a different parameter 0 i and 
different cumulant function Cj. 
It is a trivial but not entirely obvious fact that (19) works for the case 
where Yp(i) = 0 as well as for other cases. When Yv(i) = 0 the assumption 
is that Yi is the sum of zero IID random variables, and ( as mentioned at 
the beginning of Section 2.2) a sum with zero terms is zero (by convention). 
Thus the conditional distribution of Yi given Yv(i) = 0 is the distribution 
concentrated at zero, that is, Yi = 0 with (conditional) probability one. 
Since log(l) = 0, the term in the log likelihood for the conditional distribu-
tion of Yi given Yv(i) should be zero when Yp(j) = 0, and that is what (19) 
gives, because Yp(j) = 0 implies Yi= 0. Thus, although Yp(i) = 0 is a special 
case, we do not need to deal with it specially, since the general formula {19) 
works for this special case too. 11 
Thus the log likelihood for the aster model is 
l(0) = L[yjBj - Yp(j)Cj(Bj)], 
jEJ 
(20) 
and th_is works for all cases, including when some of the Yi or Yp(j) are zero. 
Now we can explain the labels attached to the arrows in the graphs (6) 
and (10). We call the labels the annotation of the graph. Each denotes the 
distribution of one of the 11D random variables of which Yi is the sum, that 
is, it denotes the distribution having cumulant function Cj(Bj), In (6) and 
(10) "Ber" indicates a Bernoulli distribution and "Poi" indicates a Poisson 
distribution. In {10) "0-Poi" indicates a zero-truncated Poisson distribution 
11This observation explains why what many think of as a missing data problem is 
not. What is the number of offspring y; in a time period when the individual is dead so 
Y,,c;) = O? In aster models Yp(j) = 0 implies Yi = 0 so Yi is not missing but known to be 
zero. As we have just seen, the aster log likelihood does the right thing in this case. 
12 
(Poisson conditioned on being nonzero). It is perhaps somewhat confusing 
that the labels do not denote the conditional distribution of YJ given Yp(j). 
For example, if the distribution having cumulant function Cj(0j) is Bernoulli, 
then the distribution having cumulant function Yp(j)Cj(0j) is binomial with 
sample size Yp(j) and canonical parameter 0j. It might seem more sensible 
to name these distributions binomial rather than Bernoulli, since the name 
binomial is more familiar to users, but this would not work in general. For 
some distributions used in aster models, we have a name for the distribution 
having cumulant function Cj(0j) but no name for the distribution having 
cumulant function Yp(i) Cj ( 0 J); zero-truncated Poisson is an example. 12 
Since each arrow in the graph is allowed to have a different exponential 
family distribution, some may be discrete distributions (Bernoulli, Poisson, 
zero-truncated Poisson) and some may be continuous (normal). However, YJ 
that are predecessor variables must be nonnegative-integer-valued because 
they are sample sizes for their successors. 13 Thus only terminal nodes of 
the graph (those having no successors) can be associated with continuous 
distributions. 
2 .5 Reparameterization 
Now we come to what is the only completely new idea in Geyer et al. 
( 2007). The log likelihood ( 20) does not have exponential family form ( 17). 
Each term has this form, but their sum does not, because of both Yi and Yp(j) 
being random in some terms. Observe that (20) is linear in the components 
of the data vector YJ and Yp(j) so the joint distribution is an exponential 
family with YJ as its canonical statistic. To identify the canonical param-
eters we rewrite the log likelihood collecting terms that multiply the same 
12Not only do we have no name for the distribution of the sum of 11D zero-truncated 
Poisson random variables, we have no explicit formula for its probability function, but we 
do not need one because of the relationship between IID and exponential families discussed 
in Section 2.3. We know the cumulant function will be Yv(i)c;(0;), and that's all we need 
to know. This ultimately derives from the property that additive terms not involving the 
parameters can be dropped from log likelihoods. Here we are dropping terms that we do 
not know how to calculate but do know do not contain the parameters. 
13Geyer et al. (2007) note that if the successor is infinitely divisible, for example, Poisson 
or normal, then the predecessor can be positive-real-valued, but this generalization has 
not been used in aster models and may be ignored. 
13 
component of y 
l(O) = LYj [oj - L Cm(Bm)l- L Yp(m)Cm(Bm)• (21) 
jEJ meJ meJ j=p(m) p(m)EF 
Recall that the Yi are random when j E J and constant when j E F so 
that in (21) the random variables are the Yi and the constants are the Yp(m)· 
Thus the canonical parameters for the joint exponential family distribution 
of the data are 
'Pi = Bj - L em(Bm), j E J, (22) 
mEJ 
i=p(m) 
which are the terms in square brackets in (21) that are the coefficients of 
the Yi. Geyer et al. (2007) observe that (22) is an invertible change-of-
parameter, because (22) can be solved for Bj giving 
Bi = 'Pi+ L Cm(Bm), 
mEJ 
i=p(m) 
(23) 
which expresses Bi as a function of 'Pi and 0m such that j = p(m), that 
is, components of 0 for successors of Bi. At terminal nodes of the graph 
(those having no successors) we have Bi = 'Pi· Now we can solve for Bi 
whose successors are terminal nodes. After that we can solve for Bi whose 
successors or successors of successors are terminal nodes, and so forth. In 
fact, we can solve in any order that finds components of 0 for successors 
before predecessors, whatever is computationally convenient. Thus (23), 
somewhat implicitly, defines the vector 0 having components Bj as a function 
of the vector <p having components 'Pi. 
The cumulant function of the joint exponential family with canonical 
parameter vector <p must be given by 
c(<p) = L Yp(m)Cm(0m), 
mEJ 
p(m)EF 
(24) 
the right-hand side being the leftovers, terms in (21) that have not been 
used in (22). As the subscripts on the summation sign say, all of the Yp(m) 
appearing in this cumulant function have p( m) E F, hence these denote 
constants not random variables so (24) does define a non-random function. 
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Using the fact that the cumulant function for the Bernoulli family is 
c(0) = log(l + e°) 
and the cumulant function for the Poisson family is 
c(0) = e8 
we get for the graph (6) 
and 
0B = 'PB 
01 = c.p7 
06 = 'P6 
05 = c.p5 
04 = c.p4 + e88 
= <{)4 + e'{)B 
'PB= 0B 
c.p7 = 01 
'P6 = 06 
c.p5 = 05 
c.p4 = 04 - e0s 
c.p3 = 03 - e87 - log(l + e84 ) 
<p2 = 02 - e86 - log(l + e83 ) 
'Pl = 01 - e85 - log(l + e82 ) 
(25) 
03 = c.p3 + e87 + log(l + e84 ) (26) 
= c.p3 + e<p7 + log(l + exp(c.p4 + e<p8 )) 
02 = <p2 + e86 + log(l + e83 ) 
= <p2 + e<p6 + log(l + exp( c.p3 + e<p7 + log(l + exp( c.p4 + e<ps)))) 
01 = <p1 + e85 + log(l + e82 ) 
= <p1 + e<ps + log(l + exp( <p2 + e<p6 + log(l + exp( c.p3 + e<p7 
+ log(l + exp( c.p4 + e<ps)))))) 
and 
c( c.p) = log(l + e81 ) 
= log(l + exp(c.p1 + e<p5 + log(l + exp(c.p2 + e<p6 
+ log(l + exp(c.p3 + e<p7 + log(l + exp(c.p4 + e<p8 )))))))) 
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As one can see, this reparameterization is quite complicated and even more 
so for larger graphs; if we were to repeat the calculations above for the 
graph (10) the formula for the cumulant function would not fit on one page. 
However, this reparameterization is very systematic and easily handled by 
the computer program that does aster models (Geyer, 2009b). Users do not 
need to know these formulas; the computer deals with them. We show them 
only for readers who want a concrete example. 
Now we have put the log likelihood of an aster model in the exponential 
family form 
l(cp) = (y, cp) - c(cp), (27) 
where the cumulant function is given by (24) and we have written the canon-
ical statistic vector as y rather than YJ and the canonical parameter vector 
as cp rather than <pJ, which we will do from now on. We see that (27) is just 
like the log likelihood for a general exponential family ( 17) except that the 
parameter has changed from 0 to cp. 
0. K. We have found that the joint distribution of an aster model is 
an exponential family and found the canonical parameters and cumulant 
function of the joint distribution. What was the point of that? 
2.6 Means, Variances, Convexity, and Concavity 
The cumulant function of an exponential family determines means and 
variances of the canonical statistic 
Eip(y) = Vc(cp) 
varip(y) = V2c(<p) 
(28a) 
{28b) 
where µ = Ecp(Y) denotes the vector whose components are µi = Ecp(Yj) 
and varip(y) denotes the matrix whose components14 are 
14The variance of a random variable Y; with mean µ; is 
varlP(Y;) = EIP{(Y; - µ;) 2 }. 
(30) 
(29) 
The covariance of random variables Yi and Yk with meansµ; and µk is (30). Note that 
when j = k (30) reduces to (29), so the covariance of a random variable with itself is 
the variance. For this reason there is no generally accepted terminology for the matrix 
with components (30). We call it the "variance matrix" because it plays the same role 
for a random vector y as variance does for a random variable. But other people call it 
the "covariance matrix" or the "variance-covariance matrix" or (annoyed at the confusion, 
inventing a new name) the "dispersion matrix." 
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and where 'vc(cp) denotes the vector whose components are µj = 8c(cp)/8cpj 
and 'v2c(cp) denotes the matrix whose components are 
82c( cp )/ 8cp;8cpk 
(Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978, Theorem 8.1). The identities (28a) and (28b) have 
a number of important consequences. First ( at least for aster models where 
the cumulant functions have known expressions), they allow probabilistic 
calculations about means and variances, which may be difficult to compute 
(involving sums and integrals) with derivatives, which are easier to compute. 
Second, they have a number of important theoretical consequences. 
A variance matrix is positive semi-definite and positive definite unless 
the distribution of the random vector is concentrated on a hyperplane, in 
which case some components can be expressed as linear functions of other 
components and eliminated. Thus we can always arrange that the distribu-
tion of the canonical statistic vector y is non-degenerate ( not concentrated 
on a hyperplane), in which case the variance matrix in (28b) is positive 
definite, which in turn implies that the cumulant function is strictly convex 
(Rockafellar and Wets, 2004, Theorem 2.14). 
Consider the map h between canonical parameter values cp and mean 
values µ defined by 
h(cp) = E<p(y) = 'vc(cp). 
Fix a possible valueµ* of the mean vectorµ= h(cp), and define the function 
q(cp) = (µ*, cp) - c(cp) (31) 
which is just the log likelihood (27) with y replaced by µ*. Applying (28a) 
and (28b) gives 
and 
'vq(cp) = µ* - 'vc(cp) 
= µ* - h(cp) (32) 
(33) 
Equation (33) implies q is a strictly concave function, 15 which in turn implies 
the maximizer cp* of q is unique if it exists (Rockafellar and Wets, 2004, 
Theorem 2.6). From calculus we know that the first derivative is zero at the 
maximum, so by (32) cp* is a solution of 
µ* = h(cp). 
15 A function f is concave if - f is convex, and strictly concave if - / is strictly convex. 
Here q is strictly concave because -q is strictly convex, because v'2c(i,o) is positive definite. 
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By assumptionµ* is a possible mean value, hence there exists a c.p* such that 
µ* = h( c.p*) and the concavity argument shows that there is only one such 
c.p*. This proves his an invertible mapping. Each mean valueµ corresponds 
to a unique canonical parameter value c.p. 
The same argument applied to the one-parameter exponential families 
corresponding to arrows in the graphical model shows that the mapping 
between f)j and ej given by 
ej = Eoj (Yj I Yp(j) = 1) = cj(Bj), 
where the prime denotes differentiation cj(Bj) = dcj(Bj)/d0j, is also an 
invertible mapping. Each conditional mean value ei corresponds to a unique 
canonical parameter value 0j of the corresponding one-parameter conditional 
exponential family. 
2. 7 Many Parameterizations 
An aster model has four parameterizations that we have introduced so 
far: conditional and unconditional mean value parameter vectors e and µ 
and what Geyer et al. (2007) call conditional and unconditional canonical 
parameter vectors f) and c.p. 
In Section 2.2 we established that the change of parameter e -+ µ is 
invertible. In Section 2.5 we established that the change of parameter 0-+ c.p 
is invertible. At the end of the preceding section we established that the 
change of parameter c.p -+ µ is invertible and that the change of parameter 
0-+ e is invertible. 
Thus all four parameterizations are equally valid. Each is interconvert-
ible with the others. The changes-of-parameter e -+ µ and µ -+ e are 
given by explicit formulas (14) and (15). The changes-of-parameter 0 -+ c.p 
and c.p -+ 0 are given by explicit formulas (22) and (23). The changes-of-
parameter 0 -+ e and c.p -+ µ are given by explicit formulas 
ei = cj(Bj) 
µ = \Jc(c.p) 
The changes-of-parameter e-+ f) andµ-+ c.p are different. We know that 
each possible unconditional mean value parameter vectorµ* corresponds to 
a unique unconditional canonical parameter vector c.p*, but we can only find 
that c.p* by maximizing the function q defined in (31). This optimization 
problem may not have a solution given by a formula as a function of µ*. 
We know the function mappingµ-+ c.p exists. We even know it is infinitely 
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differentiable by the inverse function theorem of real analysis. But we know 
nothing else about it other than that we can calculate its value at any point 
µ* by running a computer optimization algorithm to find the cp* where q 
achieves its maximum. 
Similarly, in general, we can only find the unique 0J such that e; is the 
corresponding conditional mean value parameter for the j-th arrow in the 
graph by running a computer optimization algorithm to find the 0J where 
the function 
achieves its maximum. 
Most but not all of the one-parameter families implemented in the cur-
rent version of the aster model do have expressions as formulas for the 
mapping ei ~ 0j, For example, for Bernoulli arrows 
eoi 
ej = 1 + e8i 
0j = logit(ej) 
and for Poisson arrows 
ej = eoi 
03 = log(e3) 
Thus for a graph like (6) having only such arrows we do have (very com-
plicated) expressions as formulas for the map µ ~ cp going by the route 
µ ~ e ~ e ~ cp. 
In contrast, for the zero-truncated Poisson distribution 
e·- exp(0j) 
1 
- 1 - exp(- exp(0j)) 
and this cannot be solved for 0j to give a formula expressing 03 as a function 
of e3. Thus for a graph like (10) having zero-truncated Poisson arrows, there 
is no formula expressing the mapping e ~ 0 or the mapping µ ~ cp. 
It must be admitted that the names "conditional canonical parameter" 
and "unconditional canonical parameter" for the vectors 0 and cp are some-
what misleading because the two parameters are not as analogous as the 
parallel terminology makes them seem. Pedantically, 0 is the vector whose 
components are the canonical parameters of the one-parameter exponential 
families associated with the arrows of the graph, whereas cp is the canon-
ical parameter vector for the joint exponential family distribution of the 
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aster model. Similarly, the names "conditional mean value parameter" and 
"unconditional mean value parameter" for the vectors e and µ are some-
what misleading because the two parameters are not as analogous as the 
parallel terminology makes them seem. Pedantically, e is the vector whose 
components ei are the mean value parameters for sample size one of the one-
parameter exponential families associated with the arrows of the graph, 16 
whereas µ is the mean value parameter vector for the joint exponential fam-
ily distribution of the aster model. 
2.8 Canonical Linear Submodels and Maximum Likelihood 
It may be disconcerting to the reader to be told the models described up 
to this point are uninteresting in themselves because they have too many 
parameters ( one parameter per component of the response vector, no matter 
which parameterization <p, 0, µ,ore is used) to estimate well. As is the case 
with LM and GLM, only submodels with fewer parameters are interesting. 
We call the models described up to this point saturated. We are interested 
in canonical linear submodels having parameter vector {3 related to the other 
parameters by 
<p=M/3, (34) 
which is just like (2) except that in GLM there is no requirement that the 
linear predictor vector be the canonical parameter vector, and here we do 
require this. 
Exponential families have a simple relationship with canonical linear 
submodels. The log likelihood for the new parameter vector {3 is (27) with 
M {3 plugged in for <p giving 
Observe that 
l(/3) = (y, M /3) - c(M [3). 
p 
(y, M/3) = LYj L ffijk/3k 
jEJ k=l 
(35) 
where p is the dimension of /3 and mjk are the components of the matrix 
M. If we reverse the order of summation, thinking of the sum over k as the 
16Recall that 
ei = E(yj I YP<i> = 1) 
Yp(j)ei = E(yj I Y,,(i)) 
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one for an inner product and the one over j as the one for a matrix-vector 
multiplication we get 
p 
(MT Y, (3) = L f3k L ffijkYj 
k=l jEJ 
where MT denotes the transpose of M (the matrix with j, k element mkj), 
This algebraically trivial transformation has very important statistical 
consequences. When we rewrite (35) as 
l(/3) = (MT y, /3) - c(M/3) (36) 
we see we have exponential family form. The su bmodel of the saturated 
model determined by the change-of-parameter <p = M (3 is itself an exponen-
tial family with canonical statistic vector MT y, canonical parameter vector 
/3, and cumulant function CsubmodeI(/3) = c(M/3). 
Thus the log likelihood (36) is a strictly concave function and the MLE 
/3, the maximizer of (36) is unique if it exists (from exponential family 
theory developed in Section 2.6) .17 The principle of invariance of maximum 
likelihood gives MLE of all other parameters.18 
The log likelihood is an extremely complicated function of (3, and there 
is no formula expressing /3 ·as a function of y. We know nothing about 
the MLE /3 other than that we can calculate its value for any data y by 
running a computer optimization algorithm to find the /3 where l achieves 
its maximum. 
We do know something more about the MLE fl of the mean value pa-
rameter. Differentiating (36) gives 
Vl(/3) = MT y - MT\Jc(M/3) 
= MT y- MTh(M/3) 
( the MT in the second term coming from the chain rule for differentiation), 
where h is the map µ = h(<p) = Vc(<p) introduced in Section 2.6. The 
17The MLE need not exist. Conditions for when it does not were first described by 
Barndorff-Nielsen (1978) and generalized in the author's unpublished thesis (Geyer, 1990). 
They involve a fascinating interplay of the geometry of convex polyhedra, the geometry 
of exponential family log likelihood functions, linear programming, and general statistical 
theory. A recent paper (Geyer, 2009a) gives a complete computational solution for when 
the MLE does not exist and describes what to do when it does not. That paper is only 
about GLM, but does point the way toward corresponding theory for aster models. 
18This principle says that if 0 and 1/J are two parameters related by an invertible change-
of-parameter, say 1/; = g(0), then the MLE are related by,(/;= g(0). Thus in the case under 
discussion ip = M/3, and all other parameters follow, for example,µ= Vc(tj;). 
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derivative of the log likelihood is zero at the maximum, hence the MLE 
satisfies 
MT y = MTh(M/3) 
or MT y = MTµ. This is a general property of exponential families not 
peculiar to aster models: the MLE of the mean value parameter satisfies a 
property 
observed = expected 
which is shorthand for observed value of the canonical statistic vector (for 
the submode!, here MT y) equals expected value of the the canonical statistic 
vector with the MLE parameter value plugged in (here MTµ). 
"Observed = expected" is not useful for calculation, since the matrix 
M is not full rank, so if we simply seek solutions to the linear system of 
equations MT y = MTµ, there are many solutions, only one of which is the 
MLE µ. The only way to find P, is via the path already described, first find 
/3 by maximizing the log likelihood (36) and then use the transformation 
µ = h(M(j). 
Thus "observed = expected" is useful only for interpretation. It is the 
only simple relationship between data y and the MLE µ of some parameter 
vector. Note that we have to be careful in using "observed = expected" 
because it applies only to the canonical statistic vector of the model being 
used, which in this case is not the saturated model with canonical statistic 
vector y and canonical parameter vector <p but rather the canonical linear 
submode! with canonical statistic vector MT y and (submode!) canonical 
parameter vector {3. So in this case "observed= expected" says the observed 
value of the submode! canonical statistic vector MT y is equal to its expected 
value MTµ with the MLE µ plugged in for the parameter vector µ. 
We now have added a fifth parameter vector {3 to go with the four 0, <p, 
{, and µ we already had. This plethora of parameterizations is unique to 
aster models. Because there is no difference between conditional and uncon-
ditional in GLM (components of the response vector being independent), 
conditional and unconditional are the same so 0 = <p and e = µ. This leaves 
only three parameter vectors {3, <p, andµ for GLM.19 Because for the normal 
distribution canonical and mean value parameters are the same <p = µ, this 
leaves only two parameter vectors {3 andµ for LM. 
Multiple parameterizations are considered confusing to students in ap-
plied courses about GLM and LM, so they are disguised by changing the 
191n GLM the linear predictor vector TJ, need not be the canonical parameter vector 'P, 
but there are still only three parameter vectors /3, TJ, and µ. 
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language. The components of /3 are called parameters, but <p is called the 
linear predictor vector and µ the mean vector, and that they are also pa-
rameters is not mentioned. Estimates (p and fl are called "predicted values" 
(al~hough there is no sense of future in this "prediction" and they are, in 
fact, MLE of the corresponding parameters). This is very anti-theoretical. 
It clouds the distinction between estimates fl and parameters µ, which is 
the fundamental issue in statistics. 20 
Our view, in teaching aster models, is that this attempt at avoiding 
confusion is itself a source of confusion. In teaching aster models we say 
that all five parameter vectors /3, 0, <p, e, and µ are parameters. That is, 
they are vectors that specify particular probability models within families 
of probability models. Each can be converted to any of the others by the 
changes-of-parameter discussed above. Tests of statistical hypotheses or 
confidence intervals can be performed for any of these parameters. If one 
doesn't call µ; a parameter, then what does one call confidence intervals of 
the form fl; ± margin of error? It is fundamental in statistics that confi-
dence intervals are (interval) estimates of parameters, thus the thing being 
estimated µ; must be a parameter. A voiding calling µ a parameter vector 
can only lead to confusion about what confidence intervals are. 
A fine point about the many parameterizations should be mentioned. 
For a saturated aster model there are four parameterizations 0, <p, µ, and e. 
All have the same dimension, the dimension n of the response vector. For a 
201n teaching undergraduate introductory statistics, I try to say "the sample is not the 
population" at least once a day after these terms are introduced and also say "estimates 
are not parameters" at least once a day after these terms are introduced. This is related 
to the three fundamental errors of statistics. 
1. The worst error is to not use data (anecdotes are not evidence). 
2. The next worst error is to confuse sample and population or estimates and param-
eters: if a poll says Jones is ahead of Smith by 51 to 49 percent, then the erroneous 
conclusion is to say it's all over and the election might as well not be held, even 
though the margin of error of the poll is 3 percent. 
3. The next worst error (and a very subtle one) is to fail to interpret statistical confi-
dence intervals correctly. The slogan here is "it's called a 95% confidence interval 
because it misses 5% of the time." If a poll with 3% margin of error says Jones 
is ahead of Smith by 54% to 46%, then the erroneous conclusion is to say it's all 
over and the election might as well not be held. The true unknown population 
percentages could be Jones 49% and Smith 51 % even though the poll says Jones 
54% and Smith 46% and the margin of error is 3%. In fact the probability that 
the poll results differ from the (unknown) truth by more than the margin of error 
is 5% (that's the subtle point). 
All of introductory statistics in one footnote! 
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canonical linear submodel, the parameter /3 has dimension p < n. The other 
parameterizations must also have dimension p. The set of allowed values of 
<p = M f3 is a p-dimensional vector subspace of n-dimensional Euclidean 
space. Since the maps <p ---+ µ, <p ---+ 0, and 0 ---+ e are nonlinear but smooth, 
the sets of allowed values ofµ, 0, and e are different p-dimensional manifolds 
in n-dimensional Euclidean space. 21 
2.9 More on Monotonicity 
Geyer et al. (2007) also consider what they call conditional aster models 
defined by (} = M /3 as opposed to unconditional aster models defined by 
<p = M/3. Conditional aster models do not behave as well statistically as 
unconditional aster models and have been little used. Shaw et al. (2008) 
did provide one conditional aster model example, but they could have used 
21 This is true of most aster models. The canonical parameter space of most one-
parameter exponential families used for aster models is the whole real line IR, but may be 
an open interval. The only example of the latter currently implemented is the negative 
binomial and truncated negative binomial families which have -oo < 0j < 0. 
Consider first the implications for saturated aster models. The allowed values of the 
conditional canonical parameter vector 0 is usually all of n-dimensional Euclidean space 
lRn but may be only an open subset of nr. The mappings 0 --+ I(), I() --+ µ, and 0 --+ { 
and their inverse mappings are all smooth and hence map open sets to open sets. It can 
be seen from (22) that when the set of allowed values of 0 is all of Ir, then so is the set 
of allowed values of I(). Typically, the sets of allowed values of the mean value parameter 
vectors µ and e are not all of IR.n but only open subsets thereof. 
Now consider the implications for canonical linear submodels. If the set of allowed values 
of I() for the saturated model is all of IRn, the set of allowed /3 values is all of JRP, and the 
set of allowed values of I() for the submodel is a p-dimensional vector subspace of IRn. If 
the set of allowed values of cp for the saturated model is not all of IRn but only an open 
subset thereof, the set of allowed values of /3 is the open subset of RP consisting of /3 such 
that I() = M /3 is allowed. The set of allowed values of I() is a flat p-dimensional submanifold 
(an open subset of a p-dimensional vector subspace of IRn). The sets of allowed values of 
0, µ, and e are each curved p-dimensional submanifolds of IRn, and not much more can be 
said about them. 
One of the motivations for modeling canonical parameters linearly, discussed at the end 
of the introduction, was to avoid restrictions, but we have seen that some aster models 
(those with negative binomial arrows) have restrictions. What does that do to the method 
of maximum likelihood? Not much. An exponential family is said to be regular if the set 
of allowed values of the canonical parameter is open. All exponential families used with 
aster models are regular. For a regular exponential family, the log likelihood goes to minus 
infinity as I() goes to the boundary of its set of allowed values, and this implies the MLE 
for /3 is still a solution of 'vl(/3) = 0, and the MLE for µ still satisfies the "observed = 
expected" property MT y =MTµ (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978, Corollary 9.6). Optimization 
software for finding /3 need not handle explicit constraints; it need only avoid steps outside 
the set of allowed /3 values by shortening such steps until they don't go outside. 
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an unconditional aster model instead. Their main reason for choosing a 
conditional aster model was just to provide an example of one. 22 
The choice between conditional and unconditional aster models is dic-
tated by which kind of mean value parameter is more important. As dis-
cussed at the end of Section 1, there is a multivariate monotone relationship 
between the unconditional canonical and mean value parameter vectors of 
an aster model. If <p1 and <p2 are two distinct possible values of the uncon-
ditional canonical parameter vector and µ1 and µ2 are the corresponding 
values of the unconditional mean value parameter vector, then 
Of course, the same holds true for the one-parameter conditional exponential 
families associated with each arrow of the graph. If 01 and 02 are two distinct 
possible values of the conditional canonical parameter vector and 6 and 6 
are the corresponding values of the conditional mean value parameter vector, 
then 
in fact, this holds componentwise 
j E J, 
where the subscripts j denote components. So the question is: which mul-
tivariate monotone relationship does one want? The choices are 
(37a) 
for unconditional aster models or 
(37b) 
for conditional aster models. In the vast majority of applications one wants 
(37a). 
As a concrete example, consider the aster model with graph (6) and 
suppose the primary question of scientific interest is the relationship between 
22This was not clearly stated in the paper because of the convention of scientific writing 
that every procedure be described as the unquestionably correct way to go even though 
in truth many ways are reasonable. Only by looking at papers by many different authors 
does one see that there are multiple reasonable ways to proceed in most situations. The 
first line of Tao Te Ching, literally translated as "tao that can tao is not constant tao," can 
be more loosely translated as "methodology that is useful cannot be unchanging." Science 
follows tao, but conventional scientific writing is about as untaoistic as it is possible to be. 
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Darwinian fitness, defined to be the total number of offspring produced, 
Ys + Y6 + Y1 + YB in (6), and a quantitative covariate x, which is some 
phenotypic characteristic of the organism. 23 Also we should distinguish 
between observed fitness Ys+Y6+Y1+Ys and expected fitness µ5+µs+µ1+µs. 
The primary question of scientific interest is more precisely stated as what 
is expected fitness expressed as a function of x? This function is called the 
fitness landscape or adaptive landscape. 
We have been a bit sloppy in writing expected fitness as µ5 + µ5 + µ1 + 
µ8 forgetting that (6) is only the graph for one individual. Every other 
individual has an isomorphic graph (same shape but different numbers on 
the variables). To be precise about this, we introduce two discrete variables 
ui and vi which describe where in the graph a variable Yi is. First, vi has 
values 1, ... , 8 and says which node in (6) Yi corresponds to. Second, ui has 
values O or 1 and says which kind of node in (6) Yi corresponds to: ui = 0 for 
survival nodes (vi = 1, 2, 3, 4) and ui = 1 for offspring count nodes (vi = 5, 
6, 7, 8). Now we write our canonical linear model equations concretely as 
(38) 
(abstractly, they are cp = M /3), where xi is the quantitative covariate value 
for the individual corresponding to the maximal connected component con-
taining Yi· This requires /3 to be a vector of length 10 (since vi goes from 1 
to 8, the term f3v; goes from /31 to /3s), 
Why (38)? Let us follow the logic of monotonicity and see the conse-
quences. We play a trick commonly used with all forms of regression models 
(LM, GLM, and aster): imagine an arbitrary individual (not necessarily in 
the given data) having the same true unknown parameter vector /3 but ar-
bitrary covariate value x. We can take this individual to have graph (6) in 
which case the variable indices are 1 to 8 and expected fitness is 
8 
1/J(x) = L µi(x), (39) 
i=5 
where we have written the mean value parameters as a function of the co-
variate µi(x). The function 1/J(x) is the fitness landscape (for this aster 
model); it gives the fitness of one (hypothetical) individual as a function of 
that individual's phenotypic covariate value x. 
23 Pedantically, one should say that y5 + Ya + y7 + ys is only the best surrogate of 
Darwinian fitness available in this experiment or observational study, but we will not 
bother with that. 
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Even though we have an explicit formula for µj(x) as a function of x, it 
is so messy as to be useless for reasoning about the fitness landscape. So 
we use the multivariate monotonicity property (37a). For any two distinct 
values x and x* of the covariate 
8 
0 < 2)µj(x) - µj(x*)][<pj(x) - <pj(x*)] 
j=l 
8 
= ~)µj(x) - µj(x*)][(,Bgx + ,B10x2) - (,Bgx* + ,B10(x*)2)] 
j=5 
8 
= [(,B9x + ,B10x2) - (,Bgx* + ,B1o(x*)2)] 2::)µj(x) - µj(x*)] 
j=5 
= [(,Bgx + ,B10x2 ) - (,Bgx* + ,B10(x*)2)]['1j;(x) - 'lj;(x*)] 
where the first equality comes from plugging in (38) and realizing that the 
,Bv; terms cancel because they do not involve x and that the j = 1, 2, 3, and 
4 terms are zero because for them Uj = 0. This implies that both factors in 
the final expression must have the same sign, hence 
,Bgx + ,B1ox2 < ,Bgx* + ,B10(x*)2 if and only if 7/J(x) < 7/J(x*) (40) 
We express ( 40) in words by saying that fitness on the canonical parameter 
scale (3gx + ,B10x2 is a monotone function of expected fitness 'lj;( x) and vice 
versa. Although we have only given the argument for one concrete case, the 
same argument works when ,Bgx + ,B10x2 is replaced by any function of any 
number of covariates (Shaw and Geyer, submitted, appendix on monotonic-
ity). 
This monotonicity relationship is the key to constructing scientifically in-
terpretable aster models. We must model on the canonical parameter scale 
for many technical reasons: to avoid explicit restrictions on the parameters, 
to have concave log likelihood for which optimization is simple, to have the 
properties discussed in Sections 2.10 and 2.12 below. For scientific inter-
pretability, however, we must be able to interpret our models on the mean 
value parameter scale. If there were no understandable relationship between 
the two scales - just an arbitrary function with no simple properties - then 
there would be no way to interpret our models. 
There is a simple consequence of multivariate monotonicity that is some-
times presented in its place (Geyer et al., 2007, discussion section): if one 
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canonical parameter is increased ( the rest being held fixed), then the cor-
responding mean value parameter is increased (the other mean value pa-
rameters change too but can go any which way). This statement does not 
contain the full content of multivariate monotonicity and cannot replace it 
for mathematical derivations, but it can give some idea of its import with-
out going into too much mathematics. For canonical linear submodels, this 
becomes: if f3k is increased (other betas being held fixed), then the expec-
tation of the k-th submode! canonical statistic, the k-th component of MT y 
increases ( expectations of other components of MT y change too but can go 
any which way). Thus even naive users should know about the submodel 
canonical statistic vector MT y. 
2.10 Sufficiency 
Fisher (1922) introduced not only the method of maximum likelihood 
but also the notion of sufficiency. A statistic ( function of the data that does 
not involve parameters) is sufficient if the conditional distribution of the 
data given the statistic does not depend on the parameter, that is, for data 
y a statistic t(y) is sufficient if the conditional distribution 
fo(ylt(y)) 
does not actually depend on the parameter 0. This means that the distribu-
tion of y given t(y) tells nothing about the parameter. Hence any estimate of 
the parameter should only involve the data y through the sufficient statis-
tic t(y). This is the principle of sufficiency: any sensible estimate of the 
parameter must be a function of the sufficient statistic. 
The definition of sufficiency is hard to apply, but there is a much simpler 
criterion that is much easier. If the log likelihood is a function of the data 
only through a statistic t(y), then that statistic is sufficient. An exponen-
tial family only involves the data through the canonical statistic, hence the 
canonical statistic is always sufficient. Also the method of maximum like-
lihood automatically obeys the sufficiency principle, since the maximizer of 
the likelihood only involves the data through the log likelihood which in turn 
only involves the data through the sufficient statistic. Thus sometimes the 
canonical statistic of an exponential family is called the canonical sufficient 
statistic, although the "sufficient" is redundant ( every canonical statistic is 
sufficient). 
Sufficiency may seem a pedantic distinction, but before Fisher (1922), no 
one had identified this notion nor were there any methods of estimation in 
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common use that obeyed the principle of sufficiency. Hence every methodol-
ogy introduced before 1922 was either (in hindsight) wrong or was a special 
case of Fisher's methods {in particular, the method of least squares is a 
special case of the method of maximum likelihood if the error distribution 
is assumed to be homoscedastic normal). 
The principle of sufficiency applied to aster models motivates uncondi-
tional canonical linear models (1.p = M{3). In such models the (submode!) 
canonical statistic vector t(y) = MT y is sufficient. Your humble author is of 
the opinion that in elementary statistics teaching too much is made of the 
linear change-of-parameter 
<p = M/3 {41a) 
and too little is made of the linear change-of-variable 
{41b) 
from data to (submode!) sufficient statistic.24 In fact, the latter is not men-
tioned at all in most courses about LM and GLM. Clearly each determines 
the other, because each determines and is determined by the model matrix 
M. The question is: which one does one choose to motivate the choice of 
M? Most courses about LM and GLM concentrate on (41a), teaching stu-
dents how to interpret this equation.25 Since {41b) is never mentioned in 
241n the example in the preceding section, the concrete expression of (41a) is (38). The 
concrete expression of (41b) was not derived, and we do so now. The bilinear form in the 
log likelihood is 
(y, M/3) = LYi [f3vJ + Uj(/39Xj + f310x;)] 
jEJ 
and the coefficient of each beta is the corresponding canonical statistic. Thus the canonical 
statistics are 
tk(Y) = L Yi, 
jEJ 
Vj=k 
tg(y) = LYjUjXj 
jEJ 
tio(y) = LY;u;xJ 
jEJ 
k = 1, ... ,8 
These ten statistics are the components of the sufficient statistic vector. "Observed = 
expected" says the method of maximum likelihood matches the observed and expected 
values of these ten statistics. The sufficiency principle says all inference should depend on 
the data only through these ten quantities. 
25 More precisely, they teach students how to interpret concrete instances of this equa-
tion, (38) for example. The abstraction cp = M/3 may never be mentioned in lower level 
courses in which students are not expected to understand matrices. 
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most courses, students do not learn to use it to motivate M. 
This is wrongheaded. Data are much more concrete than parameters. 
Statistical models are very abstract, and parameters even more so, since 
parameters are a mere index for models (parameters can be changed without 
changing the model, the family of probability distributions indexed). We 
sometimes express this by the slogan 
Parameters are meaningless quantities. Only probabilities and 
expectations have scientific meaning. 
Of course, some parameters are expectations. In aster models e and µ 
have scientific interpretation tied directly to data; they are expectations 
(conditional or unconditional) of components of the data (more precisely, the 
components of e have the relationship to conditional expectations recalled 
in footnote 16). Other parameters have no such meaning. In aster models {3, 
0, and <p are only weakly tied to data, through the monotonicity properties 
discussed at the end of the preceding section. 
These considerations say that (41b) has a much more direct connection 
to data and hence to reality than ( 41a). It is a triumph of abstraction that 
(41a) is preferred to (41b) in elementary statistics teaching. 
Aster models are more directly tied to reality when (41b) is used to 
motivate the choice of model (by choice of model matrix M): the principle 
is to choose M so that the components of the (submode!) canonical statistic 
vector MT y have sensible scientific interpretation. Then the aster model 
has sensible scientific interpretation. The "observed = expected" property 
assures that the MLE of the (submode!) mean value parameter vector MT fl 
also has sensible scientific interpretation, since it makes MT y =MTµ. 
We call the map t defined by (41b) the sufficient dimension reduction 
map. It reduces the dimension of the data vector y to a linear function 
MT y of smaller dimension ( the dimension of the parameter {3) without losing 
information because MT y is sufficient. 
Sufficiency is a very abstract property. It is a property of a statistic 
relative to a statistical model. Throwing away the all of the data except 
for the sufficient statistic vector loses no information about that particular 
statistical model. The point of sufficiency is purely philosophical. And it 
works both ways. Given a model, one wants to know the sufficient statistics. 
Given a set of scientifically important statistics, one wants to choose a model 
for which those statistics are sufficient. So in aster models, we want to choose 
canonical linear submodels in which the sufficient statistic vector MT y has 
components that are important scientifically interpretable quantities. 
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For a specific instance of this reasoning, let us return to the estimation 
of fitness landscapes introduced in the preceding section. In footnote 24 we 
derived the submode! canonical sufficient vector. An earlier methodology for 
estimating fitness landscapes, or, more precisely, the best quadratic approx-
imation (BQA) to fitness landscapes, was introduced by Lande and Arnold 
(1983). This method uses LM rather than aster to estimate the fitness 
landscape. If fitness satisfied the assumptions for LM, that the conditional 
distribution for fitness given phenotypic trait covariate values is homoscedas-
tic normal, then the sufficiency argument applied to that model would give 
the same sufficient dimension reduction to the same ten sufficient statistics 
tk (y), k = 1, ... , 10 that are the sufficient statistics for the aster model. 
This is because the two models agree about what fitness is (as a function of 
the data y), because they both use a quadratic model, and because both are 
exponential family models. So aster modelers agree completely with Lande 
and Arnold (1983) about the sufficient dimension reduction map. The only 
disagreement is about the statistical model: the LM used by Lande and 
Arnold (1983) is often grossly wrong for fitness landscapes whereas aster 
models may have no apparent wrongness. 
2.11 Efficiency 
Fisher (1922) introduced not only the method of maximum likelihood 
and the notion of sufficiency but also the notion of efficiency. The efficiency 
of an estimator cp of a scalar parameter cp is the expected squared error 
E{((p - c.p)2}. (42) 
The smaller the expected squared error, the more efficient the estimator. 
Here cp is a function of the data, hence a random variable, hence it has a 
distribution, 26 and it is with respect to this distribution that the expectation 
( 42) is defined. In contrast, the parameter cp is considered nonrandom, a 
property of the probabilistic law of nature that governs the generation of the 
data. The estimator cp, being random, would be different if the experiment 
or observational study were repeated, so the amount of error cp - c.p is a 
261n all but the simplest cases we do not have an explicit formula for the distribution, 
but we know it exists because every random vector has a distribution. This distribution, 
called the sampling distribution of the estimator cp is a sticking point many people have 
with statistics. You have only one data set, and you have only one estimator t.jJ calculated 
from it. It takes an act of imagination to visualize the distribution of possible other 
values of the estimator that would result from imaginary replications of the experiment or 
observational study and to think about properties of this distribution, such as efficiency. 
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random quantity, and we cannot say how large it would be, only how large 
it is on average. Hence the definition of efficiency. A more efficient estimator 
provides more accurate estimates, on average. 
When the parameter is a vector cp, then so is the estimator (p, and the 
definition of efficiency becomes more complicated, it is 
E{((p - cp)((p - cpf }, {43) 
which denotes the matrix whose j, k component is E{((p; - cp;)((pk - 'Pk)}. 
Having a matrix measure of efficiency is more difficult to understand. If 
two estimators have efficiency matrices Vi and ½, then we say the first is 
more efficient than the second if V2 - Vi is a positive semi-definite matrix. 
It may be that neither V2 - Vi nor Vi - V2 is positive semi-definite, and this 
means that some but not all components of one estimator are more efficient 
estimates of the corresponding parameter than those of the other estimator 
(neither estimator is better for all components). 
The exact efficiency of an estimator is usually impossible to calculate 
when the estimator is a complicated function of the data. Thus we make 
do with the so-called "asymptotic" distribution, which refers to the limit 
as the number of individuals in the data set goes to infinity. Under certain 
conditions the asymptotic distribution of the MLE (p is known to be nor-
mally distributed, and this (multivariate) normal distribution is centered at 
the true unknown parameter vector cp, and has variance matrix that is the 
inverse of the matrix 
which is called the Fisher information matrix, because it too was introduced 
by Fisher {1922). For a general exponential family of distributions, and in 
particular for a saturated aster model, this simplifies to 
For a canonical linear submodel with parameterization cp = M (3, this sim-
plifies to 
{44) 
(Geyer et al., 2007, Section 3.2). So for exponential families of distributions 
in general and aster models in particular we know that the asymptotic distri-
bution of the MLE /3 is normal with mean (3 (the true unknown parameter 
value) and variance J(/3)-1 (inverse Fisher information). The asymptotic 
efficiency is this asymptotic variance of the MLE 1(/3)-1. The asymptotic 
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normal distribution of other parameters can be derived via the delta method 
Geyer et al. {2007, Section 3.3). 
It is a remarkable fact about statistical estimation that maximum likeli-
hood estimates are as efficient as it is possible for an estimator to be. This 
fact was also first surmised by Fisher {1922). It is also referred to as the 
Cramer-Rao lower bound.27 
This optimality property of maximum likelihood estimators ( they are 
most efficient) is not quite correct without conditions. A large part of the 
mathematical statistics in the twentieth century was devoted to proving 
asymptotic normality of MLE under weaker and weaker conditions and to 
weakening the conditions under which MLE were efficient. Van der Vaart 
(2000, Sections 5.3, 5.5, 8.5, and 8.6) gives the current state of the theory 
(but is not easy to read). 
Asymptotic efficiency is a very abstract property. It is a property of 
an estimator (such as the MLE) relative to all other estimators. It says 
that an asymptotically efficient estimator (such as the MLE) is at least as 
good as any other estimator for sufficiently large sample sizes ( as n goes 
to infinity) when squared error (42) or {43) is the criterion. And why that 
criterion? Partly mathematical convenience - it is easy to work with and 
leads to interesting results - and partly the connection with asymptotic 
normality - for the multivariate normal distribution, the variance matrix 
is the natural criterion of error because it is a parameter of the distribution. 
The point of asymptotic efficiency is purely philosophical. It justifies using 
estimators (such as the MLE) that are efficient. 
2.12 Entropy 
Boltzmann made the connection between entropy and probability. He 
considered this his most important discovery, having S = k log W engraved 
on his tombstone (Sis entropy, Wis probability, and k is a physical constant, 
now known as Boltzmann's constant). 
Exponential families have a simple relationship with entropy (Jaynes, 
1978). The entropy of one probability distribution with probability function 
f(y) with respect to another with probability function g(y) is 
E {10g f (y)} = L f(y) log f (y), 
f g(y) y g(y) {45) 
27 Rao was a student of Fisher. Cramer (1946) was the first recognizably modern text-
book of theoretical statistics and included perhaps the first truly rigorous proof of the 
asymptotic normality of the MLE. 
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where the sum runs over allowed values of y (we consider here only the 
case where y is discrete, but the argument when some components of y 
are continuous is similar). Consider the following somewhat unmotivated 
problem (it is interesting that this setup leads to an interesting answer but 
the setup is not interesting in itself). We wish to maximize (45) subject to 
the constraints 
Tk = E1{tk(y)} = L f(y)tk(Y), keK (46) 
y 
where the Tk are arbitrary real numbers and the tk are arbitrary real-valued 
functions, and where f is allowed to vary over all possible real valued func-
tions that specify probability distributions, hence satisfy the additional con-
straints f(y) ~ 0 for all y and Ly f(y) = l. The solution to this problem 
has the following form 
f (y) = g(y) exp (L f3ktk(Y) - c(/3)) , 
kEK 
where the f3k are Lagrange multipliers (real numbers chosen to make the 
constraints (46) hold, /3 is the vector having components f3k, and c(/3) is a 
function determined by the requirement that the probabilities sum to one. 
Introduce the vector t(y) having components tk(Y) and this solution can be 
rewritten 
f(y) = g(y)e<t(y),/3)-c(/3) 
a family of distributions (if we consider {3 a parameter vector) which is an 
exponential family because the log likelihood is 
log J(y) = (t(y), /3) - c(/3) 
( we can drop the term log g(y) from the log likelihood because it does not 
contain the parameter). The canonical statistic vector is t(y) and the canon-
ical parameter vector is /3. 
This discussion is a little odd. We started with the idea that the con-
straint equations ( 46) fixed the values of certain expectations, but now we 
are considering {3 a parameter, which gives different distributions f(y) as {3 
varies over its allowed values. We know from exponential family theory that 
the relationship between the canonical parameter vector {3 and the mean 
value parameter vector 
T = E13{t(y)} 
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is invertible ( each vector f3 corresponds to a distinct vector r). Thus there is 
at most one distribution in the family that solves the constraints ( 46). But 
having gotten to this point we now drop the idea that we were attempting 
to fix the mean vector r at just one value. If we allow T to vary over its 
allowed values we get the whole exponential family because (to repeat what 
was just said) the map f3 -+ T is invertible so either (3 or T can serve as a 
parameter indexing the family. 
Thus we have arrived at a conclusion that can be somewhat sloppily 
stated as saying that exponential families arise by maximizing entropy sub-
ject to fixing the means of a set of quantities, which turn out to be the 
canonical statistics of the exponential family that arises from entropy max-
imization. If one chooses a set of statistics, then the family of probability 
distributions that maximizes entropy is the exponential family having these 
chosen statistics as its canonical statistics. 
We now emphasize that the distribution g which has been fixed through-
out the argument plays a role too. Each different choice of g gives a different 
exponential family. In the context of aster models we let g be the proba-
bility function of any distribution in the saturated model, which is given 
by biological considerations that lead to a particular graphical model. The 
maximum entropy argument applies to submodels. If we choose statistics 
t(y) of the form t(y) = MTy, in which case the vector of means being fixed 
is T = MTµ, then we know this does not take us outside the original satu-
rated model but rather leads to a canonical linear submodel. The maximum 
entropy argument then justifies these submodels saying that they are the 
models that maximize entropy subject to fixing the values of the means of 
the submode! canonical statistic vector MT y. 
Even more sloppily, we can say that the maximum entropy argument says 
that if we choose the submode! canonical statistic vector MT y to be scientif-
ically interpretable, then the corresponding canonical linear submode! will 
also be scientifically interpretable. It is the model that maximizes entropy 
(randomness) subject to controlling the mean values of MT y. 
Maximum entropy is a very abstract property. It is a property of a family 
of statistical models (each a family of probability distributions) relative to 
a statistic vector. It says that the one family in the family of families that 
is an exponential family having the chosen statistic vector as its canonical 
statistic vector maximizes entropy ( within the family of families). 
So why maximize entropy? All physical processes maximize entropy. 
Thus we expect maximum entropy models with canonical statistics that are 
scientifically important quantities to model the biological situation well. The 
point of maximum entropy is purely philosophical. It justifies using expo-
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nential family statistical models and focuses attention on their submodels 
that are themselves exponential families (the canonical linear submodels). 
3 Discussion 
All models are wrong, but some are useful. 
- George Box 
The important philosophical point about all of this is how it all hangs 
together. Many different bits of mathematical statistics play a role. All are 
part of aster models being a practical solution to biological problems. 
Start with the fact that aster models are statistical models. One does 
not need a statistical model to do some simple forms of statistical inference, 
but when one has a model - a joint probability distribution for all the 
data expressed as a function of parameters of the model - the full panoply 
of statistical methodology is available. If one has a statistical model, then 
any question whatsoever that can be phrased in terms of probabilities and 
expectations can be, in principle, answered by calculations based on the 
model. In practice, exact calculation may not be possible but approximate 
calculation based on simulation of the model is always possible. 
In life history analysis, as recounted in the introduction of Shaw et al. 
(2008), before aster models there was no way to construct a statistical model 
for complete life history data (at least no ideas were proposed before aster 
models). In the absence of statistical models for complete data, many ap-
proaches were devised. One approach was to separately analyze parts of 
the data called "components of fitness" to which available models could be 
applied. But there was no way to combine these analyses to make infer-
ence about ~tness itself. Other approaches analyzed fitness itself without 
a valid model. Both demographic approaches using Leslie matrices and 
Lande-Arnold analysis (see Shaw et al., 2008, for references) tacitly assume 
a normal distribution for fitness, which is often grossly and obviously wrong. 
All these approaches were recognized to be unsatisfactory and criticized in 
the literature reviewed by Shaw et al. (2008), but they were used despite 
their known problems because nothing else was available before aster came 
along. 
The title of Shaw et al. (2008) is "Unifying life history analysis ... " ( our 
emphasis). Previously existing approaches to life history analysis could be 
applied, even unsatisfactorily, to only a small fraction of the analyses to 
which aster models can be applied. None could do more than one of the 
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three examples of aster analysis in Shaw et al. (2008), and none could do as 
well as aster. 
So the first virtue of aster models is to provide a unified theory of de-
fensi ble statistical models for complete life history data. The description 
"defensible" is used advisedly. All statistical models are wrong. None can 
incorporate all the biology relevant to the data. But a model that is not 
obviously grossly wrong - one that passes statistical tests of goodness of 
fit - can be useful, as the Box aphorism says. 
Having a defensible statistical model may be enough for sensible statis-
tical inference in simple situations, but aster models are too complicated 
for that. Having a joint statistical model for the complete data does not, 
by itself, avoid the "components of fitness" problem. One must still use a 
model complicated enough so that all components of fitness are modeled 
well. In an aster model, such a model will typically have too many parame-
ters to estimate well if the original ( conditional canonical) parameterization 
is used. And even if there are not too many parameters, those parameters 
have no simple relationship with unconditional means, so it is difficult to 
choose submodels and difficult to interpret any deemed to fit. 
It is the change-of-parameter given by equations (22) from conditional to 
unconditional canonical parameters that is the second virtue of aster models. 
Because of the monotonicity, sufficiency, and maximum entropy properties 
of exponential families, these parameters, when modeled linearly (34) lead 
to models that have canonical sufficient statistics that are scientifically in-
terpretable and and have mean value parameters connected by multivariate 
monotone relationship (Section 2.9) with the canonical parameters that are 
modeled. It is this change-of-parameter that allows complicated data to be 
adequately modeled with few enough parameters to be estimated well, and 
it is this change-of-parameter that allows scientific interpretation of these 
models. 
The change-of-parameter from conditional to unconditional canonical 
parameters has a very abstract origin. For each concrete instance of an aster 
model - a saturated model determined by a graph with annotation and a 
submode} of it determined by a model matrix - this change-of-parameter 
could be given by explicit formulas like (25), which whether explicitly written 
out or not are "understood" and used by the aster software, but no one would 
invent such a change-of-parameter except from theoretical considerations. 
The change of parameter (22) arises from the recognition that an aster 
model is an exponential family and from the process of finding its canonical 
parameter vector. Without the notion of an abstract exponential family, 
this change-of-parameter and all the properties of aster models that flow 
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from it would never occur to anyone. 
The change-of-parameter from conditional to unconditional canonical pa-
rameters causes some conceptual difficulties to those trained to think about 
components of fitness. The unconditional aster model directly addresses 
overall fitness but does not directly address the separate components ( the 
conditional aster model does that). When one wants to have one's cake 
and eat it too (study both overall fitness and the separate components), 
unconditional aster models can do the job, but only in an indirect way 
that is difficult to wrap one's mind around. Example 2 of Shaw et al. (2008) 
presents data on fitness of Echinacea angustifolia. The experiment was done 
in two parts. Plants started life indoors in a growth chamber. Those that 
survived this initial period were replanted outdoors in an experimental field 
plot. Of interest were differences in fitness for different "cross types" rep-
resenting different amounts of inbreeding. The unconditional aster model 
found there were statistically significant differences among cross types. 
So far so good. The unconditional aster model made the analysis of over-
all fitness simple. Confusion creeps in when the question is asked whether 
the fitness differences are due to differential survival in the growth chamber 
or differential survival and growth (reproduction was not measured in these 
data) in the field plot. If one adds additional terms to the aster model mod-
eling fitness differences among cross types both in the growth chamber and 
in the field plot, the growth chamber terms are not statistically significant 
(P = 0.34). So that says differential survival in the growth chamber doesn't 
affect fitness? No! In an unconditional aster model terms for later compo-
nents of fitness propagate back through the equations to earlier ones. This 
is seen in (26) where the expression for 81 contains all components of <p, the 
expression for 02 contains all components of <p except <p1 and <ps, and so 
forth. Thus the comparison between submodels with and without explicit 
growth chamber terms says that differential survival in the growth chamber 
has no effect on fitness over and above what the maximum entropy principle 
automatically builds into the submodel that has only terms for overall fit-
ness. Confidence intervals for survival in the growth chamber (Shaw et al., 
2008, Figure 2A) show clear differences among cross types, whether or not 
the model has terms for fitness differences among cross types in the growth 
chamber. 
In short, trying to have one's cake and eat it too - trying to analyze both 
overall fitness and separate components of fitness - causes confusion. Biol-
ogists know that "components of fitness" only act together not separately, 
so analyzing the effects of the components of fitness separately must be 
problematic. Aster models treat this problematicity correctly: only overall 
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fitness is modeled simply. Once one has found a defensible aster model that 
passes tests for goodness of fit (in Example 2 of Shaw et al., 2008, the model 
with only terms for overall fitness differences among cross types), one can 
look at parameter estimates for various conditional or unconditional mean 
values to get some idea of the contributions of the separate components of 
fitness but one cannot completely disentangle them. 
Aster models are very complicated compared to LM and GLM and very 
simple compared to other graphical models. Why are aster models defined 
they way they are? Why not more simple or more complicated? Aster mod-
els are complicated enough to encompass most but not all life history data. 
The "predecessor is sample size" property is the key to aster model theory. 
Without it, the log likelihood (20) would not be linear in y {both the YJ and 
Yp(j) appearing linearly), the joint distribution of y would not be an expo-
nential family, there would be no unconditional canonical parameterization, 
and there would be no multivariate monotone relationship of parameters 
with unconditional mean values. Nor would there be strictly concave log 
likelihood, which makes MLE unique and easy to find by computer opti-
mization algorithms. So the "predecessor is sample size" property does a 
lot. 
But "predecessor is sample size" is very restrictive. Many forms of depen-
dence that can be imagined for life history data do not fit into this paradigm. 
So why stop where aster models stop? The strong theoretical properties of 
aster models mentioned in the preceding paragraph do many things but 
have two main effects: they allow simple scientific interpretation and effi-
cient computer implementation. The simplicity of interpretation comes from 
the multivariate monotonicity relationship of canonical and mean value pa-
rameter values and the sufficiency and maximum entropy properties. The 
efficiency of implementation comes from simple (for the computer) expres-
sions for the changes-of-parameter 0 ~ c.p, e ~ µ, 0 -+ e, and c.p -+ µ, 
through concavity properties of log likelihood that guarantee uniqueness of 
MLE and allow MLE and changes of parameter e -+ 0 and µ -+ c.p to be com-
puted by straightforward computer optimization, and through the relation 
(44) that gives Fisher information as a simple (for the computer) expression 
and through it the asymptotic distribution of the MLE and resulting hy-
pothesis tests and confidence intervals. Any generalization of aster models 
other than those already considered in Geyer et al. (2007) and mentioned 
in various footnotes (5, 7, 13, 17, 21) in this technical report would lose (as 
far as we can see) at least one of the the properties that give aster models 
their simple scientific interpretation and efficient computer implementation. 
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• Having defensible statistical models allows likelihood inference. 
• The efficiency property of maximum likelihood estimates guarantees 
they are good. Without the efficiency of MLE, one would have no idea 
how to proceed with complicated life history data. 
• The relationship between conditional and unconditional mean value 
parameter vectors (Section 2.2 above) is peculiar to "predecessor is 
sample size" models. 
• The multivariate monotone relationship between canonical and mean 
value parameter vectors (Sections 1 and 2.9 above) is peculiar to ex-
ponential family models. 
• Cumulant functions (Sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8, and 2.11) are pe-
culiar to exponential family models. They allow means, variances, and 
covariances of components of the canonical statistic vector, hence also 
the Fisher information matrix and the asymptotic distribution of the 
MLE to be calculated from derivatives of cumulant functions, which 
are simple for the computer to calculate. 
• The relationship between IID and exponential families (Section 2.3) is 
peculiar to exponential family models. This makes the "predecessor 
is sample size" property lead to exponential family joint distributions 
(Section 2.4). 
• The sufficient dimension reduction argument (Section 2.10 is unique 
to exponential family models. 
• The maximum entropy argument (Section 2.12) is unique to exponen-
tial family models. 
• That "structural zeros" (footnote 11} are handled automatically and 
correctly is unique to maximum likelihood estimation based on a sta-
tistical model. 
All of these points are involved in making aster models work the way they 
do. 
4 Statistical Models and Their Interpretation 
We close with a "post-discussion discussion" of an important point that 
often arises in the context of aster models but really has nothing to do with 
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them, since it applies to all statistical models. This issue is reification of 
parameters. 
Probability models are already very abstract. The nature of probabil-
ity and expectation has been argued about by scientists and philosophers 
for hundreds of years and no agreement has been reached (Hajek, 2007). 
Mathematicians cut through the confusion by axiomatizing probability and 
expectation, giving them purely mathematical definitions cut loose from 
debates about what features of the real world might or might not corre-
spond to them. Kolmogorov (1933) gave a system of axioms for probability 
theory and since then all research-level probability theory been based on 
them. Their level of abstraction is very high, requiring the notion of ab-
stract integration over so-called measurable spaces ( abstract sets equipped 
with sigma-algebras). It is so high that no one attempts to teach this the-
ory to undergraduates or master's students. This abstract integration theory 
is only taught in Ph. D. level courses in probability, theoretical statistics, 
and real and functional analysis (from textbooks like Fristedt and Gray, 
1996 and Rudin, 1986). Consequently, pre-1933 notions of probability and 
expectation are still taught in all universities in courses designed for under-
graduates and master's students (from textbooks like Casella and Berger, 
2001). Most scientists who use probability and statistics are exposed to 
them in such courses. Call this theory "master's level probability theory" 
to give it a name ( all of the probability theory in this technical report is 
"master's level"). 
Probability models in "master's level probability theory" are still very 
abstract (if not quite as abstract as in research level probability theory). 
Probability and expectation are still given purely mathematical definitions 
cut loose from debates about what features of the real world might or might 
not correspond to them. Discrete probability models are defined by giving 
a probability mass function (PMF), which is a real-valued function whose 
domain is an arbitrary (abstract) set S and satisfies two properties 
f(y) ~ 0, yE S (47a) 
( nonnegativity) and 
LJ(y) = 1 (47b) 
yES 
(sums to one). Facetiously, one can say that (master's level) probability 
theory is the study of functions that are nonnegative and sum to one. The 
domain S of the PMF is called the sample space. A real-valued function 
on the sample space is called a random variable, and the expectation of a 
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random variable g(y) is given by 
E{g(y)} = L g(y)f (y) (48) 
yes 
if the sum exists (which it may not if the sample space is infinite). Proba-
bility is a special case of expectation; it is expectation of Bernoulli (zero-or-
one-valued) random variables. If g is Bernoulli, define 
A= { y ES: g(y) = 1 }. 
In this case the expectation ( 48) becomes 
P(A) = LJ(y) (49) 
yEA 
because g(y) = 1 for y EA and g(y) = 0 for y ¢ A. The sum in (49) always 
exists because it is less than the sum in (47b) which exists by definition of 
PMF. Any subset of the sample space is called an event and (49) is called 
the probability of the event A. 
"Master's level probability theory" also studies continuous probability 
models in which the sums above are replaced by integrals, but we need not 
discuss them here, because all aster models that have been used in published 
papers are discrete, so that is all the probability theory we need for this 
discussion. 
Notice that, as we said above, these definitions have not the faintest 
trace of the philosophical arguments about what probability and expectation 
"really are." Mathematicians have simply declared that anyone's notions of 
probability and expectation that do not agree with these formal definitions 
( 48) and ( 49) will not be entertained, and conversely any notions that do 
agree with these formal definitions are fine with them. Mathematicians do 
not care about the philosophical arguments; they define expectation and 
probability mathematically and get on with doing mathematics. 
A statistical model is a family of probability models. The problem of sta-
tistical inference is, given data that is supposed to be from one probability 
model in a statistical model, to say something about which one it is.28 This 
brings us to deep philosophical waters. Statistical inference is the statisti-
cian's answer to the philosopher's questions of induction and epistemology. 
When in a totalizing mood, statisticians can think that all learning about 
28This "saying something about" can take the form of point estimates, such as maximum 
likelihood estimates, confidence intervals, or tests of statistical hypotheses. 
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the world is statistical inference. 29 But leaving that aside, what theoretical 
statistics is all about is statistical inference, so here we take the idea for 
granted. 
Statistical models are often specified by parameterization. 30 Each prob-
ability model in the statistical model is specified by a PMF that is a func-
tion of another variable ( or variables) called the parameter ( or parameters). 
When there are multiple parameters, these are thought of as a single math-
ematical object called the parameter vector. The parameterization is indi-
cated by subscripts Jo on the PMF, where 0 is the parameter or parameter 
vector (it is a convention to use roman letters for ordinary variables and 
random variables and greek letters for parameters). A subscript indicating 
the parameter is also added to the notation for expectation 
Eo{g(y)} = Lg(y)Jo(Y) (50) 
yES 
and probability 
Po(A) = L fo(y). (51) 
yEA 
Statistical models are also very abstract. Firstly, they are abstract be-
cause probability models are abstract and each statistical model is an ab-
stract set whose elements are probability models. Secondly, there is not 
only the abstraction of probability models (ignoring what probability and 
expectation "really mean") but also the abstraction of statistical inference. 
Statisticians talk about statistical models by saying one particular param-
eter value among the abstract set of allowed parameter values is the truth 
29This is obvious nonsense because people learned things long before anything was 
known of statistics, but there is a grain of truth in it. Except for logical tautologies, 
all knowledge is uncertain, and all uncertainty can be modeled by probability theory -
whether this gives a satisfactory and complete description of uncertainty is debatable, 
but such modeling is possible - from which it follows that all learning is statistical if 
the uncertainty of knowledge is to be properly accounted for. This is understood in 
the branch of philosophy called "Bayesian epistemology" (Talbott, 2008); our point here 
is that non-Bayesian statistical inference also answers epistemological questions. Most 
people most of the time feel no uncertainty about most of their knowledge; the customs of 
their tribe, sect, and clique are not questioned. This goes for intellectuals and academics 
too. Even scientists use statistics only when the uncertainty of inference is so glaring that 
any attempt at avoiding statistics must be forlorn. They use it only when they have to. 
The fact that in real life not all learning is statistical is a deep mystery. Most people most 
of the time are quite certain about many very questionable things, and this seems to work. 
But why? 
30Statistical models that are too big to be specified by a finite set of parameters exist 
and are called "nonparametric." 
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or true unknown parameter value, the latter to emphasize that which is the 
truth is unknown and the problem of statistical inference is to say something 
about which parameter value it is (footnote 28). It is "assumed" that if 0 is 
the truth, then the PDF Jo corresponding to it is the probability model "for" 
the observed data, meaning that, whatever philosophical attitude we have 
about the correspondence of probability models to the real world, we have 
concluded that this model describes the natural process generating these 
data.31 Piled on top of the probabilist's abstraction is the statistician's ab-
straction: learning the truth (about nature) is saying something about a 
parameter in a statistical model. All learning can be formalized this way, 
and statisticians do so. 
It is an observable fact about statistics teaching that the concept of 
statistical models is considered problematic and completely avoided in in-
troductory courses. The terms statistic and parameter are much discussed 
(see footnote 20), but the abstract notion of a family of probability distribu-
tions indexed by the parameter (so each particular value of the parameter 
vector specifies one probability model) is absent. The distinction is clearly 
drawn between a parameter 0 and a statistic {J used to estimate it. But 
what is left unmentioned is the fact that 0 specifies the probability model 
through its PMF f o - most introductory statistics textbooks do not develop 
enough probability theory to make this clear - and hence the estimator 0 
also specifies a probability model through its PMF / 0. 
The two probability models are different: statistics are not parameters 
so 0 is not 0, hence / 0 is not Jo, Nevertheless, 0 being unknown, our only 
guide to what Jo says about the data is / 0. So we use / 0 in place of Jo, not 
blindly or stupidly but cautiously and sophisticatedly, worrying about and 
quantifying the differences between our calculations based on / 0 and what 
those same calculations would be if based on Jo (which they ought to be but 
cannot be because 0 is unknown). 
This caution gives rise to an infinite regress: when we worry about the 
differences between Jo and / 0 we realize those differences are random because 
0 is random (being a function of the data, which are random). Thus we must 
do probabilistic calculations based on a PMF, which ought to be Jo, but we 
must use J0 because 0 is unknown. So we have higher-order worries that our 
calculations about the errors made in using /0 instead of Jo are themselves 
wrong because of the same issue. So we repeat the process, attempting to 
31 This "assumed" is for the sake of argument, to get on with the mathematics of sta-
tistical inference. The assumption may later be questioned based on the inferences made. 
In their example 3, Shaw et al. {2008) first "assume" an aster model for the data but later 
check its validity using residual analysis, their Figure 4. 
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quantify our higher-order errors, and are faced with yet higher-order errors, 
and so forth ad infinitum. Fortunately, the errors get smaller as both order 
and sample size increase and after some point can be ignored. We raise 
this infinite regress to show that statistical inference has some very deep 
philosophical issues. 
But that infinite regress is not the main subject of this section, the main 
subject is that most users of statistics, including most scientists, have only 
the foggiest ideas about statistical models. Perhaps this is the fault of bad 
statistics teaching or of human discomfort about randomness, probability, 
and statistics. Most scientists do not think of parameters 0 as mere indices 
that specify a probability model through its PMF Jo and do nothing more. 
Rather they reify parameters as "facts of nature" asking what the parame-
ters "really mean" not understanding our dictum (page 30) that parameters 
are meaningless in themselves and only have meaning through Jo and prob-
abilities and expectations calculated using Jo, If I had a nickel for every 
time I've tried to explain that fitting statistical models to data does not 
directly discover truth about nature, 32 and that the parameters estimated 
can only be interpreted through the statistical model and its properties, I'd 
be rich. I can make the same explanation over and over to the same person 
and get the response over and over "yes, I know that" but "these sorts of 
explanations" (reifying parameters) "are what's expected." That reifying 
parameters is just wrong is never directly confronted. 
Returning to aster models, Geyer et al. (2007), Shaw et al. (2008), and 
Shaw and Geyer (submitted) are careful to avoid reifying parameters, so 
much so that a referee of Shaw and Geyer (submitted) complained that more 
explanation of "what the parameters mean" was needed. When one under-
stands that the parameters don't "mean" anything and that interpretations 
should refer to the probability models indexed by parameters rather than 
the parameters themselves, how does one provide valid scientific interpreta-
tions of statistical results? One way is hypothesis tests of model comparison 
( done by the function anova for aster model fits). Models have scientific in-
terpretations, hypothesis tests compare two models, one a submode! of the 
32 Am I not being contradictory? Does statistical inference discover truth or not? When 
I am wearing my statistician hat, yes it does, "truth" being defined as the parameter value 
that indexes the correct probability model, which is "assumed" to be a member of the 
statistical model being used. When I am wearing my scientist hat, no it does not. All 
models are wrong; none capture all aspects the phenomena being studied. Moreover, to the 
extent that they capture any aspects, they do so through probabilities and expectations 
calculated using the model. Hence our emphasis on mean value parameters corresponding 
to scientifically interesting random variables. Those have direct scientific interpretation. 
Parameters, in general, do not. 
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other, and show either that the submodel fits as well as the supermodel (so 
the supermodel adds nothing useful and scientific interpretation should be 
based on the submodel) or it does not (so only the supermodel fits the data 
and scientific interpretation should be based on it). Often, this is all that 
needs to be done: report which model fits the data best. When one wants 
more, an explanation of what this "best" model does and does not say, one 
must be very careful, as we saw in the discussion of Example 2 of Shaw et 
al. (2008) (Section 3 above). What Shaw et al. (2008) did in that example 
was use confidence intervals for mean value parameters as the basis of their 
scientific interpretation. This was also done in the example in Geyer et al. 
(2007). In Example 1 of Shaw et al. (2008) the parameter of scientific inter-
est was the population growth rate .X which is a function of the mean value 
parameter vector µ through the "stable age equation" so the principle of in-
variance of maximum likelihood estimates (footnote 18) can be used to find 
the MLE of .X and the delta method can be used to find a confidence interval 
for .X. In Example 3 of Shaw et al. (2008) and the examples of Shaw and 
Geyer (submitted) the object of scientific interest is the fitness landscape, 
like the function 1/J defined by (39). This is an infinite-dimensional parameter 
(a parameter vector with an infinite number of components), being a whole 
function and the components being the values of the function for each possi-
ble argument value. So it can only be "reported" by plotting a graph of the 
function, which these papers do. Confidence regions for infinite-dimensional 
parameter vectors are possible, but too complicated to be of much use; none 
are reported in these papers. Instead, confidence regions are reported for 
specific aspects of this function such as the point where it achieves its max-
imum (the fitness optimum). Seen in this light, scientific interpretation of 
statistical results is tricky. The scientific interpretation of a statistical model 
is by no means obvious. One must decide which probabilities of what events, 
expectations of what statistics, hypothesis tests comparing what models, or 
confidence intervals for what parameters should be computed to provide a 
clear and convincing scientific interpretation. The job is only started when 
the "best" statistical model is found. 
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